Wage--Price Spiral:
inflation. Together with a nonacconunodating aggregate-demand policy, this price explosion also started a recession that was double the size of the average previous postwar recession and that lasted until spring 1975.
It is now three years since the trough of this deepest postwar recession. By the end of that recession, inflation had slowed sharply from its 1974 pace, but further improvement was slight once recovery began. From 1975 through 1977, all available measures of tightness in either labor markets or product markets registered ample slack. And no large upward movements have occurred in particular components of the price level since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries increased oil prices in 1974. Yet despite all these disinflationary developments, the rate of inflation, by any broad measure, has continued at a historically high rate and now shows signs of creeping still further upward. Table 1 summarizes the inflation in the economy since the Korean War as measured by four alternative indexes: compensation per hour, the hourly earnings index, and the price deflator, all of which are averages for the private nonfarm economy; and the consumer price index. Except in 1974 and 1975, when controls ended and oil prices soared, the three measures for the private nonfarm economy have moved closely together, with compensation per hour and the price deflator differing by approximately the trend rate of growth in labor productivity. The consumer price index is more volatile than the deflator. They have differed noticeably when the relative prices of food or imports changed a great deal, although the inclusion of these prices is not the only difference between the indexes. By any of these measures, inflation has been noticeably faster in the 1970s than in previous periods. It has been faster since 1975 than in the early 1970s. And it has been faster over the most recent four quarters than in previous years of the present recovery.
Inflation is unpopular. It hampers policymaking and inhibits the pursuit of high employment. This paper provides a basis for evaluating alternative approaches to slowing it.
The Mainline Model
In this section I briefly outline what I perceive to be the important characteristics of the U.S. economy that have led to the present stubborn inflation. Unlike many journalists describing the stagflation period, I do not conclude that economists fail to understand the economy. And unlike some professional writers of this period, I do not conclude that the Keynesian revolution got everything wrong. However, we have learned during the past ten years that the Keynesian analysis stops short of adequately modeling the inflation process.
Let me begin by describing the essential features of what I call the mainline model of the U.S. macroeconomy. It offers a description of macroeconomic behavior that is compatible with a broad range of more specific models that would have similar policy implications. I later discuss some alternative views of the economy and of the current stagflation that are not consistent with this mainline model and that have policy implications that I believe are basically misleading.
In the mainline model, wage and price behavior are closely linked, and there is at least some mutual causality between them. Because the effect of wages on prices is more predictable and better established, it is useful to begin analyzing the inflation problem by describing the macroeconomics of labor markets.
Wages respond to the tightness of labor markets but not enough to avoid fluctuations in employment brought about by corresponding fluctuations in demand. Thus, something like a Phillips curve exists, at least for periods that are relevant to policymakers and to the conduct of economic affairs, and for the range of unemployment actually experienced. Within this framework, average wages begin to rise at an inflationary rate while unemployment is still well above frictional levels. possibly to some additional effects from demand and the prices of competing imports; and an equation relating wages to the tightness of the labor market and to past or expected future inflation.
I do not present any new results on the price equations. Robert Gordon has recently reviewed the aggregate evidence and reaffirmed that prices change in proportion to wage changes." Other factors also have an effect, including the costs of raw materials, competing imports, and to a small extent, variations in demand. However, including them in the explanation does not diminish the importance of labor costs.
The principal unsettled issues are concerned with the causes of inertia in wage inflation. I turn first to some disaggregated evidence from the 1960s and 1970s. DISAGGREGATED 
WAGE CHANGES
The first evidence of the stubbornness of inflation came when average wages and prices failed to decelerate much despite rising unemployment after 1969. The behavior of wages in particular sectors is noteworthy during this period. Some wages are set under collective bargaining agreements, frequently with three-year contracts. Many factors can enter into union wage demands in such bargaining situations, including wage levels elsewhere and living costs. There is no well-established model of what unions can successfully bargain for and, especially when contracts are negotiated infrequently and prices and other wages have changed between contracts, new settlements can bear little relation to current unemployment rates. While wages set under collective bargaining may represent an especially obvious departure from short-run market clearing in wage setting, virtually no wages are set in auction markets. Long-term attachments between firms and workers are useful to both sides and characterize a large portion of the job market. In such situations, equity, which may embrace relative wages or inflation, becomes an important consideration in wage setting. Both unionization and long-term attachments characterize some industries more than others. As a consequence, wages in different industries do not move in parallel under changing economic conditions. High-and Low-Wage Industries. A random sample of 39 industries at the three-digit level of aggregation was divided into groups with high, medium, and low wages according to the average of their hourly earnings plies that inflation independently increases it. Stagflation increases it on both counts.
Equations for annual wage increases in individual industries also reveal the relatively stronger effect of inflation and the weaker effect of unemployment in the high-wage industries. Tables 2a and 2b show simple Phillips curves for each of the 26 industries in the low-wage and highwage groups. In each case, the change in hourly earnings adjusted for overtime was regressed on the average increase in the CPI over the two previous years and on the inverse of weighted unemployment.4 A dummy variable equal to 1 in 1974 and 1975 was included in each equation to avoid giving undue weight to the observations for those two years. Using annual data, wages in both years were strongly affected by the combination of food and fuel inflation and the end of controls. This situation is examined more carefully below using aggregate wage equations.
Although the individual industry equations are often unsatisfactory, the average coefficient in each group fits the expected pattern. The average coefficient on unemployment is 11.5 for the low-wage industries and 6.8 for the high-wage industries; the average coefficients on the CPI are 0.6 and 0.8, respectively. Similar results are also obtained when the CPI is replaced by average hourly earnings as the lagged inflation variable. The change in the minimum wage makes no contribution as an additional explanatory variable, even in the low-wage industries. I assume this negative result reflects the poor quality of equations for individual industries. In Gramlich's careful analysis of minimum wages, a 1 percent change in the minimum adds 0.03 percent to average wages.5 The impact on wages in low-wage industries should be many times larger than this estimate for the aggregate.
Union Wages. For the past two years, data from the employment cost index have been available for wage and salary increases in occupations both covered and not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Covered wages rose 8.1 and 7.6 percent during 1976 and 1977, respectively (fourth quarter to fourth quarter). These increases are 1.3 and 1.0 percentage points more than the rise in uncovered wages in the two years. b. The union wage change each year is the increase from current settlements plus average gains in the next two years from prior settlements and escalator provisions. Forward-looking gain is this change less the increase over the same time interval in average hourly earnings or the consumer price index. Backwardlooking gain is this change less the increase in average hourly earnings from three years earlier or the CPI. lagged values of past inflation. In order to distinguish between the two, it is necessary to turn to other types of evidence.
Various institutional or political arrangements whose purpose is to neutralize, at least partly, the effects of inflation on wages are based on a backward-looking approach. Adjustments in labor contracts to account for increases in the cost of living modify wages according to past changes in the CPI. Such arrangements make it possible to avoid forecasts of future inflation. The minimum wage law has typically been adjusted to take account of past changes in average wages. And the comparability rule for government wages relates them to past changes in wages of workers in the private sector in similar occupations.
Major union wage contracts are the clearest instance of wage commitments made well into the future. If the forward-looking hypothesis works anywhere, it should work in explaining these settlements. Table 4 analyzes wage gains in major union contracts for the period 1968-75. Column 1 shows the estimated average wage gain from settlements over the life of the contract, including gains from escalator provisions.6 Columns 2 to 5 compare these settlement increases with both past and future changes in the CPI and in adjusted average hourly earnings for the private nonfarm economy. The hypothesis that settlements are forward looking is expressed in columns 2 and 4, where the percentage increases in average earnings throughout the economy and in the CPI over the three-year duration of union settlements are subtracted from the increases under the settlements. Columns 3 and 5 express the hypothesis that settlements are backward looking. There the increase in average earnings for the economy as a whole and in the CPI over the three years ending in the year of the settlement are subtracted from the increases under the settlements. Data are available for these calculations only for the years shown.
Because these major settlements are concentrated in situations that are comparatively insensitive to unemployment rates and presumably sensitive to living costs and relative wages, the hypothesis that yields the less erratic series for wage gains should be preferred. In this case, the backward-looking hypothesis is a more satisfactory one, even though the forward-looking hypothesis is given an advantage in the contest through comparing CPI gains with settlement gains that include escalator adjustments for the same years.
AGGREGATE WAGE EQUATIONS
I turn now to some aggregate wage equations to observe how well the Phillips curve and alternative specifications of lagged inflation effects predicted wages during the 1970s. Table 5 presents Phillips curve equations for the annual change in adjusted hourly earnings in the private nonfarm sector (100 x A ln E), using three alternative lagged inflation variables: the dependent variable, the CPI (100 x A ln CP), and the private nonfarm deflator after the effects of the rise in fuel prices in 1974-75 have been removed (100 x A ln DP). Two years of lagged inflation are shown in each case, although the second year is frequently insignificant. A thirdyear lag invariably was insignificant and small or wrong-signed. Esti-6. The average gain from settlements made in year t is estimated by adding the average deferred increases in years t + 1 and t + 2 to the average first-year increase in t. The deferred increases in each year are averaged over the number of workers who did not receive first-year increases in that year. This procedure is not precise and can only approximate the actual increases that occur over the life of contracts newly negotiated in any given year. The straightforward interpretation of this drift in the estimated size of lagged inflation effects is that the significance of ongoing inflation has risen together with the rising rate of inflation. According to this interpretation, so long as rapid inflation was not sustained for an extended period, it was less important in setting wages. Alternatively, it may be that the importance of lagged effects are misestimated in the equations for some periods, and there exists a "true" set of lagged inflation coefficients that is unchanged.
Whether the lagged effects actually sum to 1.0 or to a little less than 1.0 is not important for understanding the current inflation predicament. There will be considerable inertia to inflation with any large value of these lagged effects. When the lagged effects sum to 1.0, the model has only one unemployment rate at which inflation is predicted to remain unchanged in the long run. The deflator might be expected to work in wage equations for one of two reasons: either because it represents past wage changes that affect current wages, or because changes in the price margins or profitability of firms affect wages. If it is only a proxy for the former effect, then a wage-wage model should be used directly. But occasional observations of rapid wage gains in suddenly prosperous industries-such as coal and oil after 1973 -suggest that profitability may influence wage setting.
Generalized effects of profitability are difficult to find in time-series data. Although early work on Phillips curves found an important role for profits, time-series studies that include the latest decade generally do not. A secular decline in average profitability that coincides with the acceleration of inflation may be masking a causal relation between variations around that secular decline and wage changes. Laurence Seidman, in his paper in this volume, makes such an adjustment and finds that profitability is an important explanatory variable for wages.
Attempts to use both past wages and past deflator pnces in the wage Once changes in demographics have been allowed for (by measuring tightness in the labor market with the weighted unemployment rate used here), the major change in the inflation-unemployment relation between the 1960s and 1970s is associated with the effects of lagged inflation on current wage changes. The existence of large lagged effects created inertia in inflation that transmitted past inflation to current wage changes even when current unemployment rose. In addition, the importance of these lagged effects apparently grew as inflation itself became more entrenched. Today inertia is a more important characteristic of the inflation process than it was in the 1950s and 1960s.
The disappointing experience with inflation during the 1970s can be understood as a consequence of this strong and growing inertia together with some one-time developments that added to inflation during this period. These include, in particular, the catch-up in union wages at the start of the decade and the international explosion of prices for food and fuel before the great recession.
The source of this inertia is not easily identified. Wages in high-wage industries and those set under collective bargaining are relatively insensitive to unemployment and relatively responsive to the ongoing rate of inflation. They may have been particularly important in the failure of average wages to decelerate after 1969. However, for aggregate wages to rise as fast as they have in the 1970s, the ongoing inflation rate must be an important factor in wage determination more generally, possibly as a consequence of patterning other wage changes on those in the high-wage sectors or occupations.
No single explanatory variable adequately describes the effect of past inflation on current wage changes. In general, wages responding to past wages offer a better description of the process than wages responding simply to the CPI. But to explain the developments of the mid-1970s, one needs to believe there was a substantial direct influence of prices on wages as well. This period may have been unusual, but some direct effect of past prices on wages is also estimated in equations such as 3, which are fitted to long periods that do not include the mid-1970s. In summary, to explain current wage behavior, the importance of ongoing inflation is well established, but the particular importance of ongoing price (as opposed to wage) inflation remains unsettled.
Although it is difficult to disprove the hypothesis that the inertia in aggregate wages represents expected inflation, the estimates favor the more direct hypothesis that inertia is a backward-looking phenomenon. That view is supported directly by the analysis of changes in union wages. In the aggregate equations, it is supported by the fact that inertia appears through large coefficients on recent inflation rather than through modest coefficients on inflation rates over a long past period: expectations models generally assert that expectations are adjusted gradually and therefore depend on a long past history of actual inflation. A large coefficient on recent wage changes is most naturally interpreted as a process in which wages are adjusted to keep up continuously with other wages. If these results are taken to mean that expectations are simply formed by the most recent observation of inflation, the expectations hypothesis loses any distinctive significance, for then any change in actual inflation will have a full impact on inflation in the next period, just as the backward-looking hypothesis would predict. Finally, the failure of any lagged values of unemployment to enter the wage equation argues against expected unemployment rates as an important determinant of wage changes.
Alternative Views
The mainline model that I described at the outset of this paper and the empirical evidence just presented provide a fairly general description of the macroeconomy and the inflation process. Although they leave room for alternative views about the microeconomic underpinnings of inertia and for further research on quantitative questions, they do provide a basis for discussing anti-inflation policies. The blame for inflation or the remedies for it, however, are often argued along lines that are not predicted by the mainline model or from views of the economy that are incompatible with it. Before examining what there is to learn from the mainline model about strategies for slowing inflation, I review some of these dissenting views.
BUDGET DEFICITS
If a poll were taken to sample opinions on the causes of inflation, most votes would probably go to government deficits. An economist would grant the effects of deficits on aggregate demand and would be hard pressed to find causal links between deficits and inflation over and above their effects on demand. He would also be aware that historically most deficits have come from the operation of automatic stabilizers during periods of underemployment.
Although to my knowledge no serious model predicts that actual deficits will explain inflation, equations 4 and 5 were estimated in response to the opinion polls, as follows: The actual relationship between budget deficits and economic performance is complicated, and the equations above are not intended to summarize that relationship in any meaningful way. At a minimum, variations in the deficit would have to be decomposed into those that are induced by economic activity and those that represent changes in fiscal policy at a fixed level of utilization. Equations 4 and 5 are intended simply to dispel the view that the present inflation is caused by deficits or that cutting the deficit would help eliminate inflation without causing recession.
The lack of a causal connection between budget deficits and inflation does not deny possibly important linkages between government programs and the current inflation. One important message in Robert Crandall's paper in this volume is that government programs have contributed to inflation by pursuing goals through means that raise the price level rather than through means that show up in the budget deficit. If the costs took the form of federal expenditures or tax credits and thus appeared in the deficit, they would not affect the price level, providing that the level of aggregate demand remained the same. Paradoxically, excessive anxiety about deficits can itself be inflationary.
EXCESSIVE GROWTH OF MONEY
Besides deficits, a close contender in public opinion polls on the causes of inflation would be excessive growth of money. Unlike the deficit explanation, a positive connection between money growth and inflation is acknowledged widely by the professional community. What divides economists is the issue of whether or not a causal role can be assigned to money in addition to its role as a determinant of aggregate demand. The mainline view acknowledges the role of aggregate demand in inflation and the role of money in aggregate demand. It denies any additional, special role of money in causing inflation.
Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos have reported on attempts to put money into mainline inflation equations.7 Like many other authors, they found a long mean lag for the effect of money on prices when money was used alone in a reduced-form equation. This result is entirely in accord with the view that money affects aggregate demand, thereby promptly influencing real activity and employment, and eventually the inflation rate. But they found that money was insignificant when added to equations that explain prices with the unemployment rate, import prices, and lagged inflation.
Modigliani independent explanatory power of money comes from this one episode. To believe that money has this independent role in causing inflation, one has to believe that the relatively rapid money growth of 1972-73 caused the subsequent explosion of prices in 1974-75, creating inflation directly rather than through demand variables for perhaps the first time in history. This interpretation not only strains the imagination, but is inconsistent with the historical evidence of long lags in reduced-form equations explaining prices with money.
SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS
Government programs of income maintenance would also be high on a list of popular explanations of inflation. Unemployment compensation and the minimum wage are the two programs that are most clearly related to wage behavior. Both have been studied carefully by economists and have at least potentially significant effects on labor markets. Table 7 shows the percentage of after-tax earnings that was replaced by unemployment benefits and the minimum wage as a percentage of average earnings during recent periods. Both measures rose gradually during the postwar period until the last half of the 1960s. Between 1966-70 and the present, the net replacement ratio under unemployment compensation increased slightly, while the relative minimum wage declined sharply.
As was noted earlier, Gramlich estimated that average wages rise by about 0.03 percent for each 1 percent change in the minimum.8 A substantial rise in the minimum, such as the 15 percent increase of January 1978, will have a noticeable effect on aggregate wages. However, during the period that inflation was worsening, the relative minimum wage was falling. And as the disaggregated results showed, wages in low-wage industries (where increases in the minimum wage have their principal effect) were falling behind other wages. The coverage of the minimum wage was substantially expanded in the mid-1960s, adding to its impact on average wages at that time. But that episode is too remote to have any relevance to the inflation of the 1970s. Finally, by reducing the employment prospects of young workers, the minimum wage may add to their unemployment and thus have a modest effect in shifting the Phillips 8. Gramlich, "Impact of Minimum Wages." curve. Any such effect-and I would expect it to be quite small-is captured in using the weighted unemployment rate in the wage equation. Unemployment compensation has a potential effect on wage inflation by reducing the willingness of recipients to accept available job offers. Together with other programs of income maintenance, it provides a disincentive to work compared with a situation in which no support is provided or one in which support does not depend on unemployment. However, such programs are not new to the recent years of rapid inflation. And as table 7 shows, the benefits have not become much more generous during the period when inflation has worsened.9
In the majority of cases, workers receiving unemployment compensation benefits have been laid off from jobs to which they expect to return. Wages in those jobs are inflexible because of the formal and informal relations binding employers and employees, not because workers who have been laid off are holding back their services waiting for better wages. While unemployment compensation may have some effect on the response of wages to unemployment, it is doubtful that the effect is large. The outcome might be different if most of unemployment among those who receive benefits were well described by simple search models and if wage offers were varied by firms in response to short-run variations in labor market tightness. But this is not the case.
MISPERCEPTION, PERFECT MARKETS, AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
The most serious conceptual challenge to the mainline model I have outlined comes from a view that attributes all of inflation and unemployment to misperceptions on the part of workers and firms: workers are led into more or less employment than they would normally want by their incorrect reading of wage or price trends. In a related set of models, "rational" expectations and extreme price and wage flexibility are assumed to characterize the macroeconomy. Workers are assumed to make market-clearing wage and price changes continuously, based on the best information available and constrained only by existing contracts. Except for information lags and delays until existing contracts expire, wages and prices are always adjusted to provide equilibrium levels of output and employment. Both these models have an important common feature: in contrast to the mainline model, they have variations in inflation causing variations in unemployment rather than the reverse. Without inflation surprises, unemployment would always be at a "natural rate."
The search models fail to explain the widespread phenomenon of layoffs or the cyclical pattern of quits. To the extent they predict that wages must accelerate if unemployment is to be maintained below its natural rate-their central implication-they predict wages must decelerate if unemployment is to stay above the natural rate for any sustained period. Alternatively, they may assume that misperceptions about available wage offers take a long time to be corrected. On the basis of this argument, the persistence of unemployment and inflation since the mid-1970s is understood as a continued overoptimism about available wage offers. Because most periods of unemployment have a duration measured in days or at most several weeks, it seems unrealistic to assume years of misperception to explain unemployment.
Models that combine wage and price flexibility with assumptions embodied in rational expectations about behavior have similar problems explaining persistence. Any deviation of unemployment from the natural rate can persist only until people become aware of the situation or renegotiate existing contracts. Except for three-year wage agreements negotiated with some large unions-agreements that cover only a small fraction of the work force-it is difficult to imagine price or wage arrangements in any important area of the economy that are bound by long-term contracts. Thus, when unemployment has deviated from past levels for any sustained period, the new unemployment level must be interpreted as a new natural rate. By contrast, the mainstream model that I have described recognizes sustained periods of underemployment and leaves open the possibility of changing unemployment through demand management.
Slowing Inflation: Aggregate Demand and Expectations
The inflation of the 1970s does not change the conclusion that slowing the economy and raising unemployment can slow and eventually eliminate inflation. The evidence is, however, that inflation would slow only gradually in response to holding back aggregate demand, and that the cost in lost employment and output per point of disinflation would be large. The equations of table 5 generally predict inflation will be less than one point slower in the third year of a policy that holds the unemployment rate one point higher. And the additional unemployment implies a loss of $50 billion to $60 billion a year in output in today's economy.
A different specification might alter the numerical estimates, but it could not reverse the verdict that the anti-inflation gains from restraining aggregate demand are disappointingly small. Arthur Okun recently summarized the estimates from six different econometric models and came to a similarly pessimistic conclusion.'0 Whatever view is held on the urgency of slowing inflation today, it is unrealistic to believe that the public or its representatives would permit the extended period of high unemployment required to slow inflation in this manner.
Stabilization strategy since 1975 may be interpreted as an attempt to find an output path that would gradually reduce unemployment and at the same time slow inflation. The evidence of the past few years provides little hope for such a possibility. After the hourly earnings index slowed in the early quarters of recovery, it began to accelerate gradually in 1977. 13. Martin Neil Baily, in "Stabilization Policy and Private Economic Behavior," BPEA, 1:1978, pp. 11-50, has recently explored the idea that the generalized expectation of prosperity has influenced the behavior of firms in a stabilizing way. Believing that the government will avoid the deep slumps of the past, firms themselves respond with hiring, stocking, and investment decisions that are more stabilizing than in the past. I interpret Fellner's views on inflationary expectations as analogous to this model of changing real behavior. real growth is the desired path for output and that 6 percent is the expected inflation rate. A 10 percent growth rate of aggregate demand would be accommodating. If aggregate-demand growth were held to 8 percent, the econometric evidence predicts that real growth the first year would slow by nearly 2 percent while inflation would slow only slightly. After two years, real output would be more than 3 percent below the 4 percent growth path, and prices would be about 1 percent below that path. Fellner reasons that, by making the decision to slow aggregate demand convincing, expectations would change and the division between real growth and inflation would improve. The coefficients of the model that yield pessimistic projections today would be changed by the clear determination of the authorities to adopt a nonaccommodating policy.
How plausible is this remedy for inflation? The 1973-75 recession apparently did not change the coefficients. It could be argued, however, that this period did not demonstrate nonaccommodation convincingly because policies promptly turned to aiding recovery once unemployment increased. Let me bring together the scattered evidence presented earlier for questioning Fellner's optimism.
First, the evidence is that the inertia process is expectational but to only a limited extent. That does not mean that people do not have expectations about inflation, but simply that current wage and price decisions, as opposed to decisions in other spheres such as lending or investing, are not governed by those expectations. Even in the area of long-term labor contracts, in which expectations could be important, the analysis presented above shows that wage developments are better explained as backward looking and that escalators are used to avoid predicting the future. For most questions regarding inflation it is not crucial to know whether the inertia process is forward looking or backward looking. It does matter here.
Second, even if the econometric coefficients from Phillips curves are interpreted as expectational rather than backward looking, how much will an announced policy of demand restraint affect those expectations? If a nonaccommodating aggregate-demand policy is totally convincing, it will lead people to expect that unemployment will rise. But why should this affect their expectations about inflation by more than the short-run Phillips curve predicts? If inflation responds weakly to actual unemployment, why should expected inflation respond so strongly to expected unemployment?
This leaves room for a small gain in Fellner's scheme. If there are some wage contracts made with a view to the unemployment rate anticipated in the future, expecting more unemployment should modify such contracts by the amount predicted by the Phillips curve. If a restrictive nominal GNP path is to be pursued, there is thus some gain from announcing it ahead of time. My only question is whether there is reason to expect more than the improvement predicted by the Phillips curve as applied to the expected future course of unemployment. And if even that effect is confined to a small subset of contracts that are actually forward looking, the total benefits would be limited. On the price side, there are depletable resources whose price depends on expectations of prospective demand, but these are not important in the overall price level.
If wage and price setting were sufficiently concentrated in this economy, the possibilities for affecting inflation through Fellner's route would be greatly enhanced. A roomful of private decisionmakers who recognized that their inflationary behavior would directly affect their level of output and employment would be expected to respond favorably to a government policy of nonaccommodation. That is not what occurs in the U.S. economy.
Linking an incomes policy to an announced nonaccommodating policy on aggregate demand would help achieve Fellner's result. As discussed below, an effective incomes policy would produce a more favorable prospective split between real growth and inflation for any given path of nominal demand growth. Thus, expectations of inflation would change by more than the Phillips curve predicts. And to the extent that expectations do affect current wage decisions-which is still an open question-they would complement an incomes policy. Although it is an incomes policy that changes the immediate trade-off, the nonaccommodating demand policy is a necessary complement. Without it, the reduced inflation promised by the improved trade-off could be dissipated by a movement along the new trade-off curve.
Slowing Inflation: Tax-Based Incomes Policies
Although there are several variations of tax-based incomes policies (TIPs), their differences are primarily important in determining their acceptability, the ease of their implementation, and their effectiveness in altering individual wage and price decisions. These matters are discussed in other papers in this volume. At the macroeconomic level, the main impact of alternative TIPs affecting wages will be similar. And TIPs that act on prices primarily ensure that price restraint parallels wage restraint, which is what the macroeconomic model predicts without such policies.
It is simplest to integrate TIP effects into the macroeconomic model by assuming that the same path of real output is pursued with and without the program. Starting from the present state of the economy, a TIP that causes individual wages to rise more slowly than they otherwise would can be represented simply as a reduction in the constant term of the wage equation. Whether TIP will alter the slope of the short-run Phillips curve or whether it will reduce permanently the unemployment rate that represents full employment are separate issues that are briefly considered below. With a downward shift in the constant term of the wage equation, nominal aggregate demand must be reduced by an amount that is proportional to the shift in order to maintain the desired output path. This necessitates an appropriate combined adjustment in fiscal and monetary policies. This relatively simple procedure is all that is needed to integrate TIP and aggregate demand policies in the first year; a similar adjustment is required in subsequent years if the shift caused by TIP each year could be specified. But the macroeconomic analysis does raise some questions about the size of that shift in subsequent years and the difficulty of attaining it.
LAGGED EFFECTS
In most views of the inflation process, the slower average wage increases resulting from TIP in the first year will reduce wage pressures in the second year. If prices slow correspondingly, as would be expected, this favorable lagged effect would be predicted by any of the aggregate equations discussed earlier. Because the estimated lags are short, a major fraction of the first year's improvement in inflation will be perpetuated into the second year. In actual experience, however, some of the complications introduced by TIPs might lead to lagged effects that are different from these estimates.
Any TIP program may alter slightly the distribution of wages. The possibilities are numerous and the likely outcomes differ according to whether a penalty or reward TIP is employed. The main possibility for obtaining lagged effects that are noticeably smaller than the macromodel predicts probably arises in the case of a reward TIP that is employed for only one year. On the one hand, without a reward in the second year, workers whose wages had been restrained would tend to increase their wage demands to catch up with those that had not. On the other hand, firms that had not participated would be at a competitive cost disadvantage relative to firms that had, and that would put downward pressure on their wage offers. If these two influences cancel each other, the lagged effects from the economic equations should hold.
If the lagged wage effects in the macroeconomic model represent generalized expectations, the TIP program can be viewed in two ways. First, expectations that are based on actual experience should be favorably influenced by the initial slowdown in average wages and prices under TIP. This influence can be expected to grow if TIP effects are present over successive years. Second, expectations should be influenced by the existence of TIP as a specific and acceptable anti-inflation program. It should enhance the effects on inflationary expectations that Fellner looks for through policies of nonaccommodating aggregate demand. I have argued that these policies may be weak because their primary effect would be to change expectations of unemployment. Together with TIP, a greater part of any change in nominal demand expectations would be changes in expectations of the price level.
CHANGING THE STRUCTURE
TIPs are sometimes espoused as a means of shifting the Phillips curve in a favorable direction. This is one interpretation of shifting the constant term in the aggregate-wage equation. There is little basis, however, for judging whether such a favorable shift would be maintained in a period of substantially tighter labor markets. Because excess demand in the labor market now appears to develop gradually, TIP might make the Phillips curve more nearly L-shaped. In moderately tight markets, wages might be restrained, producing an improved trade-off; but in extremely tight labor markets, TIP might be relatively ineffective and the short-term trade-off might be the same as before.
TIPs do not have to reduce the unemployment rate that represents full employment in order to be useful. They would be a valuable tool if they were simply a shortcut to price stability and slowed the present wageprice spiral without a period of sustained high unemployment. If they were also an indirect remedy for structural problems in the labor market that produce inflation while involuntary unemployment still exists, that would be a bonus.
Measures to Cut Costs and Prices
What effect can we expect on the ongoing inflation rate from one-time increases or reductions in prices or costs? We can rely on cost changes to be reflected in prices. Beyond that, the empirical evidence is unfailingly ambiguous. The price shocks of the mid-1970s affected wages, but not proportionately. Consumer prices appear to have some persistent effect on wages, but it is modest once the effects of lagged wages themselves are allowed for. On the basis of the evidence, it appears that only a minor fraction of any shock to prices would filter through into average wage changes and thus have some multiplied effect. That still makes measures to cut prices and costs worth pursuing and their opposites worth avoiding. Even if only one-quarter of any price change influences wages, 1 percent removed from the CPI reduces wage inflation by about as much as 1 percentage point more unemployment for one year.
Measures to cut prices and costs can be effectively included as part of a larger anti-inflation strategy. In any such strategy, success will be selfperpetuating. Failure in the aggregate will almost surely cause the pieces to come apart. If the government can point to direct price-cutting measures of its own, it would stand a better chance of obtaining support from the private sector, either for voluntary restraint or for TIP. And if the government could accomplish that, it could change the inertia equations in a favorable way.
Comments and Discussion
Martin Neil Baily: George Perry presents and discusses in an interesting and provocative way several hypotheses relevant to anti-inflationary policy. Perry describes convincingly the tremendous inertia in wage behavior during inflation and also brings out some new and informative aspects of the Phillips curve. I have a few doubts to raise, however, about his conclusions.
First, Perry shows the relatively greater inflexibility of wages in the high-wage and union sectors. The low-wage and nonunion sectors appear to be more responsive to short-run economic conditions. This result is plausible and can be rationalized, for example, on the grounds that wage contracts are more important in the high-wage and union sectors. The disaggregated wage equations that Perry estimates, however, contain no variables that will hold the wage distribution together. In BPEA, 2:1977, James Tobin and I developed some results suggesting the importance of the relative sectoral wage level as a determinant of the rate of change of a sector's wage. Perry does not have to accept our formulation, but one would expect some variable to be included that prevents relative wages from diverging indefinitely. In the past few years union wages have increased relative to nonunion wages. This fact is interesting in itself and relevant for wage policy. But if union wages continue to grow faster than nonunion wages, there will surely be increasing stress in the wage structure that will eventually affect the rates of change of wages in both sectors.
Second, Perry argues that the true wage equation is characterized by a "catch-up" augmented Phillips curve, rather than by an expectationsaugmented Phillips curve. The arguments for this view seemed to me unconvincing. To demonstrate this would require an analysis of how expectations are formed and how the catch-up is computed, realizing that these 292 two are different in principle and that they have in fact behaved differently enough over some historical period that the data can test the two alternatives. To be more specific, given all the shocks that have hit the economy recently and the tremendous inertia evident in wage behavior, it may have been true that the best estimate of one year's wage increase was the previous year's wage increase. If even half-true, this would make the two hypotheses difficult to distinguish.
Third, I was puzzled by two aspects of Perry's procedure and so I reran his aggregate equation. I was surprised that his wage-wage equation did not allow for serial correlation of the errors, but I discovered that this was because the correction made only a minor difference. Perry himself notes that the price feedbacks do seem to decline in importance with a serial correlation correction. However, I came to a different conclusion than In fairness to Perry, I should point out that he does say that the wagewage spiral alone cannot explain the behavior of the 1970s. This is a crucial point for both theory and policy, however, and requires more emphasis. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the rapid price inflation and slow growth of real wages in the 1970s caused an upward pressure on wage settlements, particularly in the union and high-wage sectors, as Perry's earlier results suggested. The only other alternative is to argue that Perry has sharply underestimated the true nonaccelerating-inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) or natural rate. Wage acceleration has occurred, in this alternative view, because the actual unlemployment rate for 1971-77, which averaged 6.5 percent, was below the NAIRU.
As a final check on the stability of the Phillips curve, I ran an F-test to see if the coefficients of the wage-wage or wage-price equations had shifted significantly. The null hypothesis was that the coefficients had remained constant across the 1956-69 and 1970-77 periods. These dates were selected because the lack of responsiveness of wages to the 1970-71 downturn was seen by many observers as an important break in wage behavior. The null hypothesis was rejected at the 5 percent level for my calculations of Perry's wage-wage and wage-price equations.
In short, therefore, I am less confident than Perry that we really do have a stable structural relation in current Phillips curve specifications. However, there are two lessons that Perry wants us to learn from the 1960s and 1970s. If the economy is wound up too much, wages and prices begin to accelerate. If unemployment is raised to slow things down again, it is a painful process. I have no quarrel with either of these lessons.
The regressions on inflation against the deficit and on inflation against money growth are fun. I hope the myth about the deficit is diminished by these findings. The improved performance of money growth as an explanation of the 1972-77 inflation does not give greater support to the monetarist than to the structuralist view of inflation. The Federal Reserve Board is not immune from political forces, nor should it be. It cannot tolerate prolonged, excessive unemployment. If structural factors push out the inflation/unemployment trade-off-resulting in inflationary price pressure even at high unemployment-the Federal Reserve Board is forced to accommodate at least some of this pressure. Consequently, high inflation and high money growth will tend to go together, even with a structuralist perspective.
Perry presents a brief discussion of the misperception theories. I think these theories can accommodate layoffs better than Perry indicates, but I share his general skepticism that expectational errors can plausibly explain the persistence of unemployment movements. And this also leads me to agree with his mistrust of the use of policy announcements to reduce inflationary pressure directly.
In conclusion, I commend Perry for his interesting and stimulating paper. If it did not convince me on all points, this merely reflects the difficulty of the issues being tackled.
William Poole: The basic message of George Perry's paper is that the Phillips curve is alive and well and that the evidence continues to support the proposition that higher unemployment buys a distressingly small rate of deceleration in inflation. I do not have any major quarrels with Perry on the matters analyzed in his paper.
For the purposes at hand it is not necessary to say much about the theory behind the Phillips curve. Perry is clearly writing within what may be called the original Phillips curve tradition, as distinguished from the more recent view of the curve developed by Milton Friedman, Edmund Phelps, and Robert Lucas. Under the traditional view, wage and price behavior-supported by contractual, collective bargaining, and other institutional considerations-reflects a substantial degree of inertia, whereas according to the view held by Friedman, Phelps, and Lucas, inertia is not inherent in behavior but reflects correctly perceived inertia in inflation caused by the monetary policies of the government. The importance of distinguishing between these two views is that according to the traditional view, demand management can reduce inflation only slowly and painfully, while under the alternative view, expectations could in principle be altered relatively quickly and, therefore, at little unemployment cost.
Perry attempts to provide evidence on this issue by examining what he calls forward-looking and backward-looking Phillips curve specifications. I find his evidence supporting the backward-looking specifications unconvincing. Consider, for example, the implications of the forward-looking theory for the apparently backward-looking wage-wage specification. Suppose wages are set on the basis of a price forecast for the next several years. Clearly, in trying to explain the wage behavior of the current year, last year's wages could be a more accurate measure of current expectations of future inflation than any proxy constructed from past or future price changes. I believe that it is simply not possible to obtain convincing evidence on this issue from the approach Perry follows.
From other evidence there can be no question that forward-looking behavior is important. The increasing use of cost-of-living clauses reflects a structural modification to contracts in anticipation of continuing inflation. In nonunion situations many companies have apparently replaced annual salary reviews with semiannual reviews so that wages can be linked more closely to changes in price level. And evidence from episodes of hyperinflation in other countries makes it clear that institutional practices seemingly anchored in bedrock are adjusted amazingly rapidly when inflation reaches triple-digit and higher rates.
If Perry underestimates the importance of forward-looking behavior, as I think he does, the near-term policy significance of this issue is nevertheless limited. Even the most ardent believer in the importance of expectations has a difficult time finding policy proposals that promise to gen-erate a quick and lasting change in inflationary expectations. Suppose, for example, that the Federal Reserve announced that money growth would be reduced to a 4 percent annual rate immediately and then held at that rate indefinitely. It would be unlikely that this announcement would change inflationary expectations. The Federal Reserve has not always achieved its announced money growth targets; moreover, there is a possibility that the President, the Congress, or both would force a change in Federal Reserve policy if a recession occurred. From this viewpoint, the problem is not an economic policy problem at all, but rather one of constructing a political consensus for a noninflationary monetary policy.
It is unlikely that long-run inflationary expectations can be reduced without an actual decline in inflation and clear evidence of a commitment to less inflationary policies. For the evidence to be clear, it may well be necessary for the government consciously and deliberately to avoid following expansionary policies in the next recession.
If Perry's estimates are taken at face value, a monetary policy that kept the unemployment rate 1 percentage point above the natural rate would be consistent with a decline in the inflation rate by 0.3 percentage point each year. That policy would then call for a deceleration of money growth sufficient to slow nominal GNP growth by 0.3 percentage point a year. With this policy it would take at least twenty years of unemployment at 1 percentage point above the natural rate to reduce the inflation rate to zero. (Indeed, with Perry's two-year lag structure, it would take nearly thirty years.) It is difficult for me to believe that prediction of the results of such a monetary policy; surely in time the policy would change expectations and lead to adaptations consistent with full employment on the average. Nevertheless, Perry's estimates may well be reasonable for the time required for changed policies to become credible and to affect expectations. This period could easily be three to five years.
A number of policy proposals, including tax-based incomes policies, should be viewed in the light of their prospects for reducing the unemployment costs of the more basic anti-inflationary policy of slowing money growth. Perry mentions, but insufficiently emphasizes, the importance of reducing nominal income growth. Without monetary deceleration, other policies to reduce inflation are absolutely guaranteed to fail; with monetary deceleration, these other policies may reduce the employment costs of slowing inflation.
